CVE-2007-6755

Published: 11 October 2013

The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.

Status

Notes

Dual_EC_DRBG has been under suspicion long enough that I suspect
none of our libraries use it by default, though some may make it available
for legacy compatability. It might be worthwhile to remove it entirely, so
that unsafe mechanisms aren't available to provide a false sense of safety.

openssl only seems to have Dual_EC_DRBG in the fips module, not
in the regular source.

References

• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-6755
• https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html
• http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect
• http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655/
• http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf
• http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html
• http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html
• http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/
• NVD
• Launchpad
• Debian